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ABSTRACT
One fascinating aspect of the Indian basic-structure doctrine for 
a German lawyer is that its origin and development were influenced 
by the German scholar, Dietrich Conrad. This paper therefore focuses 
on Conrad’s work and his French and German sources for the argu-
ment that there are implied limits on the amending power. It 
describes the journey of this idea to India and specifies which parts 
of these prior theoretical works were lost in time and space, which 
survived, and which were developed further.Finally, there is acom-
parison between the justification for the basic- 
structure in the Kesavanada judgment and the earlier German and 
French theoretical works. The main thesis is that the Indian basic- 
structure doctrine is a powerful example of how to justify implied 
limits on constitutional amendment based on a rule-of-law approach 
that is firmly rooted in the idea of a democratic and constitutional 
state.
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Introduction
One fascinating aspect for a German constitutional lawyer of the Indian basic- 
structure doctrine that was set out in the groundbreaking judgement, 
Kesavananda Bharati v. Kerala,1 is that it is said to have been influenced by the 
works of the German scholar, Dietrich Conrad.2 I will therefore focus on Conrad’s 
work and his sources for the argument that there are implied limits on the amend-
ing power. I will describe the journey of this idea to India and try to discern 
whether and, if so, which parts of the prior theoretical works were lost in time 
and space, which survived and which were developed further. This is a cautionary 
tale of migration, integration, invention and forgetting.
CONTACT Monika Polzin monika.polzin@wu.ac.at Vienna University of Economics and Business, Vienna Austria
1Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala AIR 1973 SC 1461, 1480, Indian Kanoon – < http://indiankanoon.org/doc/257876/> 
accessed 3 March 2020.
2A.G. Noorani, “Behind the ‘basic structure’ doctrine” (2001) 18 (19) Frontline – https://frontline.thehindu.com/other/ 
article30159673.ece > accessed 3 December 2020; Sudhir Krishaswamy, Democracy and Constitutionalism in India (OUP 
2010) xvi-i. The article of the German scholar Dietrich Conrad, “Limitations of Amendment Procedures and the 
Constituent Power” (1970) The Indian Yearbook of International Affairs 375 was cited several times by the Indian 
Supreme Court in Kesavanada Bharati v. State of Kerala (n 1) paras. 979, 982, 1485, 2069 and 2151. See in more detail 
below.
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The tale begins in Germany and France at the start of the 20th Century (see I. below). 
During this period, the German constitutional lawyer, Carl Schmitt,3 and the French 
constitutional lawyer, Maurice Hauriou,4 wrote theoretical works that argued for implied 
constitutional limits on constitutional amendment. Both works are highly significant, as 
they established the two principal lines of argument that can be used at a theoretical level to 
justify implied limits on constitutional amendment.
The tale proceeds with the work of the German lawyer, Dietrich Conrad, who 
influenced the Indian basic-structure doctrine. It will describe Conrad’s work and how 
he used the work of Schmitt and Hauriou to defend the idea of implied limits on the 
amending power and its application to the Indian Constitution (see II. below).
Next, the tale explains the justification for the Indian basic-structure doctrine and how 
it can be distinguished from the earlier theoretical works (see III. below). Finally, the tale 
ends on a cautionary note (see IV. below).
I. The French and German theoretical works: Carl Schmitt and Maurice 
Hauriou
The German and French constitutional lawyers, Carl Schmitt and Maurice Hauriou, 
developed the idea of implied constitutional limits on constitutional amendment at the 
start of the 20th Century with two very different theoretical approaches. Schmitt’s theory 
of implied limits on constitutional amendment was based on a certain mystical concept 
of the constituent power5 (see 1. below). By contrast, Hauriou6 argued in the tradition of 
the French philosopher, Abbé Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès, and relied on the procedural 
approach that the constituent power was to be exercised by a constituent assembly, and 
on the idea that certain fundamental principles were higher (natural) law and therefore 
constituted a limitation on amending (and possibly also framing) a constitution (see 2. 
below).
A. Carl Schmitt’s work: constituent power as the ultimate power
Carl Schmitt (1888–1985), the most renowned theorist on implied constitutional amend-
ment, developed his theory in the book, “Verfassungslehre,” published in 1928. He did so 
within the framework of the then German Constitution of 1919. The so-called Weimar 
Constitution did not contain any material limits on constitutional amendment. The 
relevant article (Article 76) stated only that:
The Constitution can be amended by legislation. However, a decision of the Reichstag [the 
then German parliament] regarding the amendment of the Constitution only takes effect 
when two-thirds of those present consent. Decisions of the Reichsrat [the organ represent-
ing the governments of the German Länder] regarding amendment of the Constitution also 
require a two-thirds majority of the votes cast. If a constitutional amendment is concluded 
by initiative in response to a referendum, then the consent of the majority of enfranchised 
3Carl Schmitt, Verfassungslehre (Dunker & Humblot 1928).
4Maurice Hauriou, Précis de Droit Constitutionnel (2nd edn, Recueil Sirey 1929); Maurice Hauriou, Précis Élémentaire de Droit 
Constitutionnel (2nd edn, Recueil Sirey1930).
5Schmitt, Verfassungslehre (n 3) 77.
6Hauriou, Précis de Droit Constitutionnel (n 4) 276; Hauriou, Précis Élémentaire de Droit Constitutionnel (n 4) 81–2.
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voters is required. If the Reichstag passes a constitutional change against the objection of the 
Reichsrat, the President is not permitted to promulgate this statute if the Reichsrat demands 
a referendum within two weeks. 7
Schmitt derived his theory of implied limits on constitutional amendment from the idea that 
the constituent power was the basis for all powers (‘Grundlage aller Gewalten’8). He argued 
that the constituent power was a legal entity that existed outside, alternatively alongside, 
a constitution. The will of this almighty constituent power (which could either be the people 
or the monarch9) was the reason for the existence and validity of a constitution.10 Only the 
constituent power itself was able to decide on fundamental questions relating to the “manner 
and form of its own political existence” (“Art und Form der eigenen politischen Existenz”).11 
These fundamental decisions (such as the form of government, the introduction of funda-
mental rights, the separation of powers, etc.) formed the “constitution in its positive sense” 
(“Verfassung im positiven Sinn”), which had to be distinguished from the written 
constitution.12 According to this distinction, the then German constitution of 1919 (the so- 
called Weimar constitution) consisted of norms that incorporated fundamental decisions, 
and therefore made up the real constitution, and further, less important norms that were not 
part of the real constitution, and that could be described as being only “constitutional laws” 
(“Verfassungsgesetze”).13
Accordingly, Schmitt applied an understanding of the notion of the constitution that 
was widespread at this time. He distinguished between the essential norms of a constitution, 
which formed part of the material constitution, and other provisions which did not have the 
value of a constitutional norm.14 Schmitt then tied this view to the idea of a constituent 
power that existed outside and alongside a constitution. He argued that, under the 
amendment provision (Article 76)15 of the Weimar Constitution, only such provisions as 
constituted constitutional laws could be amended by the amending power as a constituted 
power (“pouvoir constitué”).16 The amending power was not permitted to change those 
norms that made up the constitution in the material sense. Those provisions could only be 
amended or altered by the constituent power. In relation to the Weimar Constitution, this 
constituent power was the people.17 Schmitt wrote:
The limits for constitutional amendment follow from the rightly-understood notion of 
constitutional change. A competence given only by a constitutional law to amend the 
constitution means that one or several constitutional laws can be changed, but only on 
the condition that the identity and continuity of the constitution as a whole are preserved. 18
7An English translation of the Weimar Constitution can be found in: Carl Schmitt, Constitutional Theory (Jeffrey Seitzer tr, 
Duke University Press 2008) 421.
8Schmitt, Verfassungslehre (n 3) 77.
9ibid 23, 75 seq.
10ibid e.g. 9, 75–6.
11ibid 76.
12ibid 21.
13ibid. 20 et seq. 76 and 104.
14Carl Schmitt, Die Diktatur (3rd edn, Dunker & Humblot 1964) IX.
15See above n. 7.
16Schmitt, Verfassungslehre (n 3) 101–2.
17ibid. 27, 105 and 177–8.
18ibid. 103. The German original text reads as follows: ‚Die Grenzen der Befugnis zur Verfassungsänderungen ergeben sich 
aus dem richtig erkannten Begriff der Verfassungsänderung. Eine durch verfassungsgesetzliche Normierung erteilte 
Befugnis, die ‚Verfassung zu ändern‘, bedeutet, daß einzelne oder mehrere verfassungsgesetzliche Regelungen ersetzt 
werden können, aber nur unter der Voraussetzung, daß Identität und Kontinuität der Verfassung als eines Ganzen 
gewahrt bleiben.‘ Translation by the author.
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At the same time, he argued expressly against precisely specifying and enumerating 
the unamendable parts of the Weimar Constitution.19Schmitt also did not specify 
how the people could act as the constituent power. The use of the constituent power 
was not and could not be subject to a legal process.20 Neither a real constitution nor 
a constitutional law could regulate the use of the people’s constituent power as the 
basis for all powers.21 The people could instead use this constituent power “through 
any recognizable or visible expression of direct will that is directed towards deciding 
on the manner and form of existence of a political union.”22
Schmitt developed his ideas of a constituent power by isolating Abbé Emmanuel 
Joseph Sieyès’ idea23 from the French revolution24 (that the pouvoir constitué was to be 
separated from the constituent power) from its historical context and applying it within 
an existing democratic constitution. In doing so, Schmitt absolutized and falsified the 
work of Sieyés.25 Schmitt established an absolute figure of the pouvoir constiuant, which 
was also a (natural-law-based) legal entity that always existed above and alongside 
a constitution.26 Where Schmitt differed was that this entity only existed within the 
framework of an already-existing democratic constitution and not within a monarchy. 
Within a monarchy, the constituent power lay with the monarch.27 This is an important 
difference from Sieyés’ work. Sieyés regarded the constituent power of the people as 
existing natural law that included the right of a nation to give itself a constitution within 
the framework of an existing monarchic order.
In addition, Schmitt generalized and absolutized Sieyès idea that only the will of a nation 
was necessary to frame and enforce a constitution28 (which originally had the purpose of 
excluding the king from the constitution-making process). Schmitt argued that the constitu-
ent power of the people remained the right to decide on all basic political matters, even within 
an existing democratic constitution. Schmitt disqualified Sieyès idea, that a special constituent 
assembly should have the authority to elaborate and amend a constitution,29 as anti- 
democratic.30 He replaced this idea with his own idea of a mythical will of the people not 
subject to control.
In line with this mystical approach, Schmitt was opposed to judicial oversight and 
ascribed the role of the “guardian of the Constitution” in the Weimar Constitution to the 
executive branch, namely the President of the Reich.31
19Carl Schmitt, ‘Zehn Jahre Reichsverfassung ‘ (1929) 58 JW 2313, reprinted: Verfassungsrechtliche Aufsätze aus den Jahren 
1924–1954 (3rd edn, Dunker & Humblot 1957) 40.
20Schmitt, Verfassungslehre (n 3) 82 and 84.
21ibid 79.
22ibid 82. The German original text reads as follows: ‚durch irgendeinen erkennbaren Ausdruck seines unmittelbaren 
Gesamtwillens, der auf eine Entscheidung über Art und Form der Existenz der politischen Einheit gerichtet ist.‘ 
Translation by the author.
23Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès, Qu’est-ce que le Tiers-Etat? (Éditions du Boucher 1789, repr 2002).
24The famous passage reads as follows: ’Dans chaque partie la constitution n’est pas l’ouvrage du pouvoir constitué, mais 
du pouvoir constituant.’ (Sieyès (n 23) 53).
25See also Joel Colón-Ríos, ‘Five Conceptions of Constituent Power’ (2014) 130 L.Q.R. 306, 329: “No constitutional theorist 
has taken Sieyès further than Carl Schmitt.”
26Particularly clear: Schmitt, Verfassungslehre (n 3) 91.
27ibid 103–4.
28Sieyès (n 23) 54 et seq.
29ibid 60.
30Schmitt, Verfassungslehre (n 3) 80.
31Carl Schmitt, Der Hüter der Verfassung (Dunker& Humblot 1931) in particular 70, 156, 158–9 (1931).
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To reiterate, Schmitt’s theory on unconstitutional constitutional amendment rested on 
two main pillars and one auxiliary argument. The first pillar was a material understanding 
of the constitution. The second was the idea of an almighty and mystical extra- 
constitutional constituent power. The auxiliary argument was that amendment did not 
mean the annihilation (“Vernichtung”) or abolition (“Beiseitigung”) of a constitution.32 
During the Weimar period, Schmitt’s theory was unique and differed fundamentally from 
the approach of his fellow jurists, who were mainly legal positivists. Schmitt’s theory can in 
particular be clearly distinguished from the work of Hans Kelsen.33 Kelsen, along with the 
majority of German constitutional lawyers at that time, did not recognize the idea of an 
almighty constituent power outside the constitution. Instead, they regarded the constituent 
power, in contrast to the ordinary legislative branch, as a special constitutional organ (for 
example, a special constituent assembly) that had the authority to amend the constitution. 
Kelsen wrote, in accordance with Sieyès’ approach, that some constitutions distinguished 
between the legislative and the constituent power.
This was the case if constitutional laws could only be amended by a special constitu-
tional organ (such as a special assembly) and not by the ordinary legislative branch.34 
According to Kelsen, the doctrine of constituent power consisted of situations where 
positive law demanded special i.e. more elaborate procedures for amending certain 
norms (either by a special majority of the legislative organ, approval by a special 
organ – such as a constitutional assembly – or by referendum).35 Kelsen emphasized 
that the idea that certain norms could exclusively be amended by the will of the people 
could only be derived from natural law.36 In line with this positivist view, Kelsen 
concluded that a constitutional norm was not capable of amendment if a constitution 
contained an express provision declaring the whole constitution or certain norms 
eternal.37 Kelsen’s approach also corresponded with the view of the majority of constitu-
tional lawyers during Weimar. Based on Article 76 of the Weimar Constitution,38 the 
majority (e.g. Anschütz39 and Thoma40)41 argued that there were no material limits on 
constitutional amendment. They based their arguments on the wording of Article 76 
itself, and on the theoretical assumption that the Reichstag (the then parliamentary 
32Schmitt, Verfassungslehre (n 3) 104.
33See also Claude Klein, The Eternal Constitution – Contrasting Hans Kelsen and Carl Schmitt: Hans Kelsen and Carl 
Schmitt A Juxtaposition (Dan Dinner & Michael Stolleis (eds), Bleicher Verlag 1999) 61–70.
34Hans Kelsen, Allgemeine Staatslehre (Springer 1925) [253]
35ibid [253]. The German original reads as follows: ‚Es kann sich bei der Lehre von dem pouvoir constituant nur um einen 
der positivrechtlich zu begründenden Fälle erschwerter Normänderung handeln.‘ Translation by the author.
36ibid.
37ibid [254].
38See above note 7.
39Gerhard Anschütz, Die Verfassung des Deutschen Reiches, Kommentar für Wissenschaft und Praxis (Verlag von Georg 
Stilker 1932) 401–06; see in more detail Monika Polzin, ‘Constitutional Identity, Unconstitutional Amendments and the 
Idea of Constituent Power‘ (2016) 14 Int’l J. Const. L. 411, 415–21.
40See e.g. Richard Thoma, Das Reich als Demokratie Handbuch des deutschen Staatsrechts 1 (Richard Thoma & Gerhard 
Anschütz (eds), Mohr Siebeck 1930) § 16, 186, 199. Thoma regarded public international law as the only limit on 
constitutional amendments. However, as Thoma argued that only international tribunals are competent to decide 
whether national constitutional law violates public international law, his argument had no further relevance during the 
Weimar Constitution (Thoma, Die juristische Bedeutung der grundrechtlichen Sätze der deutschen Reichsverfassung im 
Allgemeinen: Die Grundrechte und Grundpflichten der Reichsverfassung, Kommentar zum zweiten Teil der 
Reichsverfassung 1 (Hans C. Nipperdey (ed), Hobbing 1929) 42–43).
41Other proponents of this view were, inter alia, Sigmund Jeselsohn, Begriff, Arten und Grenzen der Verfassungsänderung 
(Winter 1929) 62–64 (especially at 62); Margit Kraft Fuchs, ‚Prinzipielle Bemerkungen zu Carl Schmitts Verfassungslehre‘ 
(1930) 12 Zeitschrift für Öffentliches Recht 511 532; cf. also Hans Nawiasky, Die Grundprobleme der Reichsverfassung, 
Erster Teil (Springer 1929) 25–26.
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assembly) was both the legislature and constitution-making body.42 The reason for this 
assumption was that the Weimar Constitution did not provide for a special body (such as 
a constitutional assembly) for constitutional amendment and there was, therefore, no 
constituent power.43
Nevertheless, Schmitt’s theory is still significant in German constitutional thought today. 
The eternity clause (Art. 79, para. 344 of the current German constitution (the Basic Law)), 
which contains explicit constitutional limits on constitutional amendment, is partly inter-
preted through the lens of his theoretical works. Schmitt’s theory was reintroduced into 
German constitutional law, in particular through the vocabulary of “constitutional 
identity.”45 Art. 79, para. 3 GBL is and was interpreted by many writers46 in light of 
Schmitt’s doctrine. Art. 79, para. 3 GBL is understood as an expression of the general idea 
that constitutional amendment should not touch upon “the basic choices of the constituent 
power, the identity, [and] the core of the constitution.”4748 In addition, referring to Schmitt’s 
ideas, Art. 79, para. 3 GBL is seen as an expression of the distinction between constituent 
power and constituted power.49 This distinction has led to the argument that only constituted 
powers are bound by Art. 79, para. 3 GBL, whereas the constituent power has reserved its 
right to decide on the eternity clause and its substance and, therefore, continues to have 
power over the eternity clause. In 2009, this approach was adopted to some extent by the 
German constitutional court in its landmark Lisbon judgement. In this judgement, the 
German Constitutional Court made the connection between constitutional identity (Art. 
79, para. 3 GBL) and the distinction between constituent power and constituted powers 
derived from the democratic principle.50 The German Constitutional Court held:
From the perspective of the principle of democracy, the violation of the constitutional identity 
codified in Article 79.3 of the Basic Law is at the same time an encroachment upon the 
constituent power of the people. In this respect, the constituent power has not granted the 
representatives and bodies of the people a mandate to dispose of the identity of the constitu-
tion. No constitutional body has been granted the power to amend the constitutional princi-
ples which are essential pursuant to Article 79.3 of the Basic Law. The Federal Constitutional 
Court monitors this.51
42Anschütz (n 39) 401.
43See e.g., Richard Thoma, Grundbegriffe und Grundsätze: Handbuch des Deutschen Staatsrechts 2 (Richard Thoma & 
Gerhard Anschütz (eds),Mohr Siebeck 1931) §71, 108, 153.
44Article 79 para. 3 reads as follows: “Amendments to this Basic Law affecting the division of the Federation into Länder, 
their participation on principle in the legislative process, or the principles laid down in Articles 1 and 20 shall be 
inadmissible.”
45See in more detail Polzin (n 39) 421–433.
46However, other authors (correctly, in my view) do not understand article 79 para. 3 GBL as a codification of Schmitt’s 
doctrine (see, e.g., Hans-Ulrich Evers, Bonner Kommentar, art. 79 para. 3 (Wolfgang Kahl, Christian Waldhoff & Christian 
Walter (eds),45th. suppl C.F. Müller 1982) para. 66; Tobias Herbst, Legitimation durch Verfassungsgesetzgebung (Nomos 
2003) 29–30; Hans Nawiasky, Die Grundgedanken des Grundgesetzes für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Kohlhammer 
1950)123.
47Dietrich Murswiek, Die verfassunggebende Gewalt nach dem Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Dunker & 
Humblot 1978) 172. Translation provided by the author.
48See also Otto Bachhof, Verfassungswidrige Verfassungsnormen (Mohr Siebeck 1951) 35; Christian Tomuschat, 
Verfassungsgewohnheitsrecht (Winter 1972) 100; Udo di Fabio, ‚Der neue Art. 23 des Grundgesetzes‘ (1993) 32 Der 
Staat 191, 211 note 71; Claude Klein, Théorie et pratique du pouvoir constituant (PUF 1996) 108; Karl-E. Hain, Die 
Grundsätze des Grundgesetzes (Nomos 1999) 46.
49See Dietrich Murswiek, ‚Maastricht und der Pouvoir Constituant‘ (1993) 32 Der Staat 161, 171; Peter M. Huber, ‚Die 
Anforderungen der Europäischen Union an die Reform des Grundgesetzes‘ (1994) Thüringer Verwaltungsblätter 1, 2.
50BVerfGE 123, 267 (343–44) – Lisbon.
51ibid. 344 [218].
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Thus, Schmitt’s distinction between constituent power and constituted powers is still 
alive in German constitutional thought. However, in contrast to Schmitt, the German 
constitutional court regards the constituent power as a legally-entrenched power that 
might also be limited by principles of natural law.52
B. Maurice Hauriou and the concept of constitutional legitimacy
Maurice Hauriou (1856–1929), a “classic” among the French lawyers of the 20th 
Century,53 was a professor of administrative law (from 1888) and constitutional law 
(from 1920) at the University of Toulouse in France.54 At about the same time as Schmitt, 
Hauriou developed implied limits on constitutional amendment. Hauriou, who is accu-
rately described by Arato as being “simultaneously a realist and normativist”,55 is not well 
known outside France.56 Unlike Schmitt’s mystical ideas, Hauriou developed a structured 
and rule-of-law-based unconstitutional amendment theory rooted in a commitment to 
democracy57 in his constitutional law treatises, “Précis de Droit Constitutionnel”58 and 
“Précis Elémentaire de Droit Constitutional,”59 first published in 1923.
The first strand of Hauriou’s theory is an understanding of the concept of constituent 
power in the same line as Sieyès’ work.60 For Hauriou, the constituent power was the 
founding legislative power that acted in the name of a sovereign nation.61 In addition, the 
constituent power was not completely unbound, but subject to certain rules of law.62 It 
should be exercised by an organ that was close to the nation itself. Therefore, the genuine 
constituent organ was a national assembly expressly elected to elaborate the 
constitution.63 The process could be complemented by submitting the constitution to 
a national referendum.64
Regarding the power to amend, Hauriou implied firstly that, due to the special nature 
of a constitution as the highest law, an amendment should be made by a special 
procedure that could be distinguished from ordinary legislation.65 He then distinguished 
between a partial and total revision of a constitution. A total revision of a constitution 
could – like the enactment of the constitution – only be done by a national assembly 
specifically elected for this purpose. For Hauriou, “the right institution for a total revision 
is a national convention expressly elected for this purpose.”66 Consequently, he regarded 
the amending power as a limited power bound by the relevant amendment provisions, 
52ibid 343 [217].
53Norbert Foulquier, “Maurice Hauriou, constitutionaliste (1856–1929)” (2009) 2 Jus Publicum, Revue internationale de 
droit publique, 1.
54ibid. 4–5, note 18.
55Andrew Arato, Post Sovereign Constitution Making (Oxford University Press 2016) 37.
56ibid.
57See clearly Hauriou, Précis de Droit Constitutionnel (n 4) 143–5.
58Maurice Hauriou, Précis de Droit Constitutionnel (1st edn, Recueil Sirey1923).
59Maurice Hauriou, Précis Elementaire de Droit Constitutionnel (1st edn, Recueil Sirey1923).
60See in detail above under 1.
61Hauriou, Précis de Droit Constitutionnel (n 4) 248. The original French text reads as follows: “Le pouvoir constituant est un 
pouvoir législatif fondateur agissant au nom de la nation souveraine.”
62ibid 258.
63Hauriou, Précis Élémentaire de Droit Constitutionnel (n 4) 79.
64ibid.
65ibid.
66ibid113. The French original text reads as follows: “l’organe d’une révision totale est un Convention nationale élue 
specialement pour cet object.” Translation by the author.
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unless it was composed like a national assembly.67 In addition, Hauriou even argued that 
ideally even a constitutional assembly should be bound by the relevant constitutional 
limits during the amendment process.68
In addition to this rule-of-law based approach to the concept of constituent power, 
Hauriou argued that certain principles were so essential that they had a higher rank or 
legitimacy than the written constitution itself, irrespective of whether those principles were 
contained in the constitution. He described them as “principles that have a higher legiti-
macy than the text of the written constitution and that do not have to be expressly 
embodied in the constitution.”69 Those principles could be derived from the fact that the 
law itself was an organized system (“système organisé”).70 They expressed the most 
important content of the relevant (constitutional) legal system (“expriment ce qu’il y a de 
plus essential dans la loi”).71 Those core principles had the highest legitimacy and therefore 
constituted the constitutional legitimacy (“légitimité constitutionnelle”).72 Clear examples 
of such principles in French constitutional law were the core content of the fundamental 
rights73 and the Republican principle.74 Possible further principles were equality, the 
separation of powers between the administration and the judiciary, and the publication 
of tax regulations.75 Hauriou implied that a constitutional amendment has to be in 
conformity with those principles.76
However, Hauriou’s work is ambiguous on whether those principles were natural-law 
principles77 or whether they could be deduced from the relevant legal and/or constitu-
tional system itself. On the one hand, he wrote that these were the most important 
principles of the social order of justice that had established society.78 On the other hand, 
Hauriou argued that their superior constitutional legitimacy could be found in the fact 
that every system of law was an organized system.79 He then described the specific 
constitutional-legitimacy principles of French Constitutional law and argued that the 
constitutional control of ordinary laws in the United States was derived from the absolute 
legitimacy of individual principles contained in the old Anglo-Saxon common law.80 
Nevertheless, Hauriou’s theory is fundamentally different from Schmitt’s approach, as 
the constituent power is regarded as a potentially legally limited power of a specifically 
elected constituent assembly. The limited amending powers of a revision organ that is not 
a constituent assembly are justified by higher constitutional principles and the idea that 
the right of a total revision of constitution lies in the hands of a specifically elected 
national assembly. This difference seems to have been be ignored by Schmitt,81 who 
67ibid 82–3.
68Hauriou, Précis de Droit Constitutionnel (n 4) 258–9.
69ibid 81. The French original text reads as follows: “La superlégalité constitutionelle contient des principes dont la 





73ibid 81, 114 and 243.
74ibid 81.
75ibid 82.
76Hauriou, Précis Élémentaire de Droit Constitutionnel (n 4) 304.
77In this sense ibid 304 and Précis de Droit Constitutionnel (n 4) 276.
78Hauriou, Précis de Droit Constitutionnel (n 4) 239.
79Hauriou, Précis Élémentaire de Droit Constitutionnel (n 4) 81.
80ibid.
81See also Andrew Arato, “Multi-Track Constitutionalism Beyond Carl Schmitt” (2011) 18 Constellations 324, 325.
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admired Hauriou and referred to him for the justification of implied limits on constitu-
tional amendment.82
Hauriou also addressed (albeit quite briefly) the judicial oversight of constitutional 
amendments.83 He argued for judicial oversight and implied that a constitutional judge 
should have the right to annul unconstitutional amendments. He wrote: “Going even 
further: Even constitutions should not be deprived of constitutional control. There exist 
also situations where judicial oversight should also cover constitutional laws.”84 Unconsti 
tutional constitutional amendment could arise if the prescribed amendment procedure 
were not observed85 or if the amendment violated constitutional legitimacy (“legitimité 
constitutionnelle”).86 He also based his idea on the constitutional law of the United States of 
America. Hauriou argued that the idea that the content of an amendment could be 
unconstitutional was not expressly rejected by the Supreme Court of the United States.87 
He referred in particular to the Supreme Court’s decision in State of Rhode Island v. Palmer 
of 7 June 1920.88 This decision dealt with the Eighteenth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution, which the American Congress proposed in 1917 and ratified in 1919.89 
This Amendment contained the prohibition against intoxicating liquor in the United 
States. The Supreme Court held its brief judgement that the Amendment had become 
part of the U.S. Constitution, as it was made in observance of the prescribed constitutional 
procedure,90 without dealing with the question of whether the content of the Amendment 
itself could be unconstitutional.
To conclude, Hauriou recognized a limited amending power if the relevant amending 
organ was not a constituent assembly, and pointed to certain higher principles that limited 
the power to amend and possibly also to make a constitution. However, in French doctrine 
and jurisprudence, Hauriou’s position is and was rather exceptional. His contemporaries, 
like Carre de Malberg (1861–1935) and Léon Duguit (1859–1928), adopted somehow 
different approaches. Malberg’s ideal was that the power to amend the constitution should 
be clearly distinguished from the legislative power, and should lay in the hands of a different 
constitutional organ (such as a specially-elected constitutional assembly) in order to protect 
the constitution.91 Duguit seems somewhat closer to Hauriou, as he argued that the French 
declaration of Human Rights of 1789 (“la Déclaration des droits de 1789”) was also binding 
on a constituent assembly due to its special character as the fundamental law of the French 
nation and all other nations.92 However, Duguit also argued in his oeuvre (without cross- 
referencing the supra-constitutional nature of the French Declaration of Human Rights) 
82Carl Schmitt, Legalität und Legitimität (2nd edn, Dunker & Humblot 1968) 61; Carl Schmitt, “Die legale Weltrevolution” 
(1978) 17 Der Staat 321, 324.
83Hauriou’s modern approach to jurisdictional control can already be found in his article “An Interpretation of the 
Principles of Public Law” (1918) 31 Harvard Law Review 813–821, where he also justified the power of the judicial 
authority to declare statutes unconstitutional.
84Hauriou, Précis de Droit Constitutionnel (n 4) 269. The French original reads as follows: “Allons plus loin: la loi 
constitutionnelle elle-même ne doit pas échapper au contrôle du juge, il y a des occassions oŭ le contrôle pourrait 
s’exercer sur elle.” Translation by the author.
85ibid 260.
86ibid 269.
87ibid 239 note 7 and 276; Hauriou, Précis Élémentaire de Droit Constitutionnel (n 4) 304.
88Hauriou, Précis de Droit Constitutionnel (n 4) 277.
89State of Rhode Island v. Palmer (1920) 253 U.S. 350 (United States Supreme Court).
90ibid No. 1–5.
91Carre de Malberg, Contribution à la théorie générale de l’Etat: spécialement d’après les données fournies par le droit 
constitutionnel français Tome 2 (Recueil Sirrey 1922) 583–624.
92Léon Duguit, Traité de droit constitutionnel Tome III (2nd edn, E. de Boccard 1923) 564–7.
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that a special constituent assembly, irrespective of whether its authority was to frame or 
a revise a constitution, was unbound and that even constitutional provisions on material 
limits to constitutional amendment could be overruled by a constituent assembly.93 This 
latter line of thinking prevailed and corresponds with current French doctrine and 
jurisprudence.94 The French Constitutional Council95 and the majority view of French 
doctrine equalize the amending and constituent powers. A legally-relevant constituent 
power outside the constitution is not recognized. One of the most famous opponents of 
this approach is George Vedel, who wrote:
The derived constituent power has the same nature as the initial constituent power: the 
constitution prescribes only a procedure (which can by the way be revised [. . .]), it cannot 
limit its exercise (since even the prohibition relating to the republican form of government 
in article 89, last paragraph, loses its validity if revised).96
Consequently, it is argued that the French eternity clause (Art. 89, para. 5) can be 
abolished by the amending power97 and merely has moral value.98
II. Migration, integration and forgetting: Dietrich Conrad’s work
Schmitt’s theoretical works99 were mainly used by Dietrich Conrad, a German 
lawyer from the University of Heidelberg, to argue for implied limits on amending 
the Indian Constitution. Hauriou’s work played only a limited role for Conrad, in 
particular when writing about the nature of the constituent power.100 Conrad 
touched very briefly on Hauriou’s approach, but did not elaborate further on his 
idea that there might be certain absolute limits on constitutional amendment.101
In 1965, Conrad gave a lecture on “Implied Limitations of the Amending Power” 
at the Law Faculty of the Banaras Hindu University,102 and afterwards wrote 
significant articles in Indian law journals on implied limits on constitutional 
amendment. The first and most important article was titled, “Limitations of 
Amendment Procedures and the Constituent Power” and was published in the 
Indian Yearbook of International Affairs in 1970. This article was also cited in the 
93Léon Duguit, Traité de droit constitutionnel Tome IV (2nd edn, E. de Boccard 1923) 538–544.
94See in detail Polzin (n 39) 433–6.
95Constitutional Council: CC decision 2006–540DC, 27.01.2006, [19]; CC decision 2006–543DC, 20.06.2006, [6]; CC decision 
2008–564DC, 19.06. 2008, [44]; CC decision 2010–605DC, 12.5.2010, [18]; CC decision 2014–694DC, 28.05. 2014, [4]; see 
also Commentaire de la décision no. 2003–469 DC du 26 mars 2003. Les Cahiers du Conseil Constitutionnel, Cahier No. 15, 
4 < https://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/sites/default/files/as/root/bank_mm/commentaires/cahier15/ccc_469dc.pdf 
> accessed 3 March 2020.
96George Vedel, “Schengen et Maastricht” (1992) 8 R.F.D.A. 173, 179 [Translation provided by the author]; see also, e.g., 
Jacques Robert, “La forme républicaine du gouvernement” (2003) 119 REV. DR. PUB. SCI. POL. 359, 362.
97See also e.g. Robert Badinter, Le conseil constitutionnel et le pouvoir constituant: Mèlanges Jacques Robert (Georges 
Vedel et al (eds), LGDJ 1998) 217, 219. However, some authors argue that art. 89 para. 5 could only be altered by 
a referendum Olivier Jouanjan, “Le forme republicaine de gouvernement, norme supraconstitutionnelle?” in: Mathieu 
Bertrand & Michel Verpeaux (ed), La République en Droit Français (Economica 1996) 267, 285–6.
98Francis Hamon & Michel Troper, Droit Constitutionnel (35th. edn LGDJ 2014) 46–7.
99See e.g. Conrad, “Limitations of Amendment Procedures and the Constituent Power” (n 2) 388. See in more detail 
below.
100Dietrich Conrad, “Constituent Power, Amendment and Basic Structure of the Constitution: A Critical Reconsideration” 
(1978) 6 &7 Delhi Law Review 1 12 note 45, 14 note 53 and 20, note 75; Conrad, “Limitations of Amendment Procedures 
and the Constituent Power” (n 2) 409 note 85 and 87.
101Conrad, ‘Constituent Power, Amendment and Basic Structure of the Constitution (n 98) 16 note 60. Conrad also argues 
like Schmitt himself that Schmitt was influenced by Hauriou without elaborating on the differences. See also note 79.
102A.G. Noorani, “Behind the ‘basic structure’ doctrine” (n 2).
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Kesavananda judgement.103 The second publication appeared in the Delhi Law 
Review in 1978 and was titled, “Constituent Power, Amendment and Basic 
Structure of the Constitution: A Critical Reconsideration”.
In his lecture, which is said to have influenced Indian constitutional doctrine 
strongly,104 Conrad used extreme examples of constitutional amendments to draw 
attention to the idea of implied limits on constitutional amendments. He stated:
Perhaps the position of the Supreme Court is influenced by the fact that it has not so far been 
confronted with any extreme type of constitutional amendments. It is the duty of the jurist, 
though, to anticipate extreme cases of conflict, and sometimes only extreme tests reveal the 
true nature of a legal concept. So, if for the purpose of legal discussion, I may propose some 
fictive amendment laws to you, could it still be considered a valid exercise of the amendment 
power conferred by Article 368 if a two-thirds majority changed Article I by dividing India 
into two states of Tamilnad and Hind proper? Could a constitutional amendment abolish 
Article 21, to the effect that forthwith a person could be deprived of his life or personal 
liberty without authorization by law? Could the ruling party, if it sees its majority shrinking, 
amend Article 368 to the effect that the amending power, from thereon, would rest with the 
President acting on the advice of the Prime Minister? Could the amending power be used to 
abolish the Constitution, and reintroduce, let’s say, the rule of a Moghul emperor or the 
Crown of England?105
In his first article written after the Indian Supreme Court’s decision in Golak Nath v. State of 
Punjab,106 Conrad referred in particular to the German Weimar Constitution, its Article 76 
(which also contained only formal limits on constitutional amendment)107 and Schmitt’s 
works. Conrad described the key contents of Schmitt’s theory with the following words: 
“that an amendment could not change the basic structure of the Constitution.”108 He 
emphasized that this view “should engage our attention here” as he perceived Schmitt’s idea 
as appropriate to the Indian constitution (“relevance for any constitution of the rigid 
type.”).109 He described Schmitt as “one of the leading constitutional writers in the 
Weimar era”.110 However, Conrad did not refer to Schmitt’s role during the Nazi era in 
Germany. He ignored those aspects of Schmitt’s work that referred to the constitution- 
destroying nature of his idea of constituent power111 and his work after 1933, in which he 
applied his idea of constituent power to justify the rise to power of the National Socialists in 
Germany and the “Führerprinzip”.112
Even though Conrad remained silent on this part of Schmitt’s work, he did not adopt 
Schmitt’s mystical idea of an almighty constituent power not subject to control.113 What 
makes Conrad’s article unique is that he introduced, and worked with, Schmitt’s theory to 
justify implied limits on constitutional amendments, but recreated Schmitt’s understanding 
of constituent power. Conrad argued for a rule-of-law based understanding of constituent 
103See note 2.
104Saya Prateek, “Today’s Promise, Tomorrow’s Constitution: Basic Structure, Constitutional Transformations and the 
Future of Political Progress in India” (2008) 1 NUJS L REV 417, 444.
105The text of the speech is reprinted in: Prateek (n 104) 445.
1061967 AIR 1643.
107See above under I.1.
108Conrad, “Limitations of Amendment Procedures and the Constituent Power” (n 2) 388 note 86.
109ibid 388.
110ibid.
111Carl Schmitt, Die Diktatur (n 14) 137.
112Carl Schmitt, ‚Der Führer schützt das Recht‘ (1934) DJZ 946, 947.
113Conrad, “Limitations of Amendment Procedures and the Constituent Power” (n 2) 396 et seq.
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power. For Conrad: “constituent power signified a distinct and more directly creative 
influence in the institution of all other authority.”114 He also pointed out that: “Constituent 
power therefore is not sovereignty, but is only part of it.”115 In addition, Conrad argued that 
the constituent power should speak through constituent assemblies.116 However, in his later 
article, he seemed to tend towards a more mystical understanding of the concept of 
constituent power.117Conrad then used Schmitt’s distinction between constituent 
and amending power as an interpretive device for Article 368 of the Indian 
Constitution,118 and concluded:
Turning our attention towards the particular type of amendment procedures which have 
prompted our discussion in the first instance, i.e. provisions like Art. 76 Weimar 
Constitution or Art. 368 Indian Constitution, we shall hardly escape the conclusion that 
these provisions do not embody the constituent power but are special legislative procedures 
of a more technical and limited application. (. . .) No precaution is taken to bring out a direct 
and specific constituent will of the nation against the daily considerations of political 
routine.
He argued for a limited amending power due to the danger of a ‘legal revolution’119 and 
pointed out this issue in Schmitt.120 Conrad also stressed that the doctrine of implied 
limitation was “a doctrine of last resort” that should only apply to prevent the abuse of 
power and be limited to cases that are absolutely clear.121 He described the limits on the 
amending power as follows:
The functional limitations implied in the grant of amending power to Parliament may 
then be summarized thus: No amendment may abrogate the constitution. No amend-
ment may effect changes which amount to a practical abrogation or total revision of 
the constitution. Even partial alterations are beyond the scope of amendment if their 
repercussions on the organic context of the whole are so deep and far reaching that the 
fundamental identity of the constitution is no longer apparent.122
III. Migration, invention, integration and forgetting: The Indian 
basic-structure doctrine
A. The Kesavananda judgement and the invention of the basic-structure doctrine
The Indian basic-structure doctrine was developed by a very narrow majority (7:6) in the 
landmark Kesavananda judgement in 1973. The narrow majority of judges (namely, Sikri 
114ibid 403.
115ibid 405.
116ibid 424 et seq. He also sees the problem that a constituent assembly may decide by simple majority and not as the 
legislator by a qualified majority.
117He writes: “The very essence of the concept is that an exercise of the constituent power does not depend for its validity 
either on its legality or illegality in terms of the pre-existing order, but entirely on the positive character as an act of self- 
determination, i.e. a decision that can be attributed to the authorship of the citizenry as a whole.” (Conrad, ‘Constituent 
Power, Amendment and Basic Structure of the Constitution (n 98) 9).
118Conrad, “Limitations of Amendment Procedures and the Constituent Power” (n 2) 411; reaffirmed: ‘Constitutent Power, 
Amendment and Basic Structure of the Constitution (n 100) 14.
119Even clearer in his second article Conrad, ‘Constituent Power, Amendment and Basic Structure of the Constitution (n 
100) 16: “The limited amendment power should prevent a Putsch of the legislature.”




C. J. Hegde and Mukherjea, JJ.; Shelat and Grover, JJ.; Jaganmohan Reddy, J.; and Khanna, 
J.) reasoned that Article 368 of the Indian Constitution did not enable parliament to alter 
the basic structure or framework of the Constitution. In the later Minerva Mills judgement, 
this reasoning was correctly summarized by way of the famous expression:
The theme song of the majority decision in Kesavananda Bharati (Supra) is: ‘Amend as you 
may even the solemn document which the founding fathers have committed to your care, 
for you know best the needs of your generation. But the Constitution is a precious heritage; 
therefore, you cannot destroy its identity.123
The Kesavananda judgement is unique for a variety of reasons, which notably include its 
length, depth of analysis, very rich comparative work, and the difficulty of understanding 
its reasoning, as it is more a compilation of different judicial opinions than one unified 
judgement.
In the absence of a uniform theoretical and interpretive approach, the limited 
amending power of parliament was justified using a variety of arguments and 
different, sometimes even contradictory, interpretive approaches to Article 368 of 
the Indian Constitution.
However, what the majority arguments have in common, apart from the assump-
tion that the Court was empowered to decide on the legality of unconstitutional 
amendments,124 is that all the judges adopted an approach rooted in the rule of law 
clearly distinguishable from Schmitt’s mystical ideas. The works of Schmitt and 
Hauriou were not explicitly mentioned; only Conrad’s work was sometimes cited, 
as it was also relied upon by the Applicant.125 Conrad’s contention that the 
amending power was limited was expressly embraced by Judge Khanna126 and 
expressly rejected by Judge Chandrachud.127 The key argument in favour of implied 
limits on constitutional amendment was the word “amendment” itself (see (a) 
below). Further arguments were the will of the founding fathers, eternal principles 
and the nature of the constitution (see (b) below), the distinction between consti-
tuent power and the power to amend (see (c) below) and preventing the abuse of 
parliamentary power (see (d) below).
(a) The meaning of amendment. The core textual argument128 was that the word 
“amendment” in Article 368 of the Indian Constitution did not include the right to 
repeal, alternatively to destroy the Constitution. This notion was, in particular 
relied upon by Judge Sikri,129 Judges Shelat and Grover,130 Judge Reddy,131 and 
Judge Khanna. Judge Khanna wrote:
123Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Ors vs Union of India AIR 1980 SC 1789.
124Krishnaswamy (n 2) 28.
125See above note 2.
126Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (n 1) [1485] [Khanna].
127ibid [2069] and [2151] [Chandrachud].
128Krishnaswamy (n 2) 29–31.
129Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (n 1) paras. 91, 225–6, 311 [Sikri].
130ibid. [580] [Shelat and Grover].
131ibid. [1196–7] and [1260] [Reddy].
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The word “amendment” postulates that the old Constitution survives without loss of its identity 
despite the change and continues even though it has been subjected to alterations. As a result of 
the amendment, the old Constitution cannot be destroyed and done away with; it is retained 
though in the amended form. What then is meant by the retention of the old Constitution? It 
means the retention of the basic structure or framework of the old Constitution.132
(a) Eternal principles, the founding fathers’ will and the nature of the Constitution. 
Another line of reasoning was the idea that certain principles contained in the 
Constitution were eternal; this was however expressly rejected by Judge 
Khanna.133 This ‘structural interpretation’134 of the Indian Constitution by 
Judge Sikri was particularly close to Hauriou’s ideas. Like Hauriou, Sikri relied 
on the assumption that the content of a constitution could also be derived from 
the “scheme of the Constitution” itself.135 He then justified the limited scope of 
parliament’s amending power on the basis of the structure and content of the 
Indian Constitution. He notably drew on its preamble,136 its “basic structure” built 
on the “basic foundation, i.e., the dignity and freedom of the individual,”137 and 
the idea that those core principles were eternal. He wrote that it was commonly 
understood “that fundamental rights would remain in substance as they are and 
they would not be amended out of existence. It seems also to have been a common 
understanding that the fundamental features of the Constitution, namely, secular-
ism, democracy and the freedom of the individual would always subsist in the 
welfare state.”138
A related argument was made by Judges Hedge and Mukherjea. They stressed that it 
was difficult to accept that Constitution’s framers had provided for the destruction of 
their ideals in the Constitution itself,139 and also justified implied limits on constitutional 
amendment on the basis of the nature of the constitution itself:
Our Constitution is not a mere political document. It is essentially a social document. It is 
based on a social philosophy and every social philosophy like every religion has two main 
features, namely, basic and circumstantial. The former remains constant but the latter is 
subject to change. The core of a religion always remains constant but the practices associated 
with it may change. Likewise, a Constitution like ours contains certain features which are so 
essential that they cannot be changed or destroyed. In any event it cannot be destroyed from 
within. In other words, one cannot legally use the Constitution to destroy itself. Under 
Article 368 the amended Constitution must remain ‘the Constitution’ which means the 
original Constitution. (. . .)The personality of the Constitution must remain unchanged.140
(i) Distinguishing between constituent and amending power. A further argument 
was the distinction between the constituent power (understood in the tradition of 
132ibid. [1480] [Khanna].
133ibid [1509–1514] and [1599 (ix)] [Khanna].
134Krishnaswamy (n 2) 33.
135Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (n 1) [226].
136ibid [124] [Sikri].
137Particularly clear ibid [317].
138ibid [309] [Sikri]
139ibid [690] [Sikri]: “We find it difficult to accept the contention that our Constitution-makers after making immense 
sacrifices for achieving certain ideals made provision in the Constitution itself for the destruction of those ideals.” 
A similar argument was also raised by the Judges Shelat and Grover, ibid. para. 619.
140ibid [690].
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Sieyès and Hauriou as a special organ, namely a constituent assembly) and the 
amending power that is vested in parliament. Judges Shelat and Grover wrote:
Indisputably, a Constituent Assembly specially convened for the purpose would have the 
power to completely revise, repeal or abrogate the Constitution. This shows that the 
amending body under Article 368 cannot have the same powers as a Constituent 
Assembly. (. . .) If the Constitution makers were inclined to confer the full power of 
a Constituent Assembly, it could have been easily provided in suitable terms. (. . .).141
(i) Preventing the abuse of power. Finally, another underlying argument for implied 
limits on constitutional amendment was to prevent an abuse of parliamentary 
power.142 This was made particularly clear by Judge Sikri, who wrote:
Article 368 can itself be amended to make the Constitution completely flexible or extremely 
rigid and unamendable. If this is so, a political party with a two-third majority in Parliament 
for a few years could so amend the Constitution as to debar any other party from function-
ing, establish totalitarianism, enslave the people, and after having effected these purposes 
make the Constitution unamendable or extremely rigid. This would no doubt invite extra- 
Constitutional revolution.143
B. Migration, invention, integration and forgetting
The justification for the basic-structure doctrine can therefore be clearly distinguished 
from Schmitt’s problematic theory. The idea of an almighty constituent power not 
subject to control has not successfully migrated into the Indian basic-structure doctrine 
and will hopefully remain forgotten. Only the general idea that the amending power is 
a limited power and Schmitt’s auxiliary argument (not his own invention, but found in 
U.S. legal doctrine),144 that amendment does not include destruction,145 have survived.
The crucial difference between Schmitt’s perspective and the Indian basic- 
structure doctrine is that the latter is clearly founded on the rule of law. The 
rationale of the basic-structure doctrine seems to protect the core or identity of 
the Indian Constitution as a value in and of itself, as it guarantees democracy and 
individual freedom. This idea is plainly rooted in the idea of a constitutional and 
democratic state. It therefore bears a higher degree of similarity to the theoretical 
approach of Hauriou, who also wanted to protect certain principles because of the 
structure of the constitutional and democratic system.146 The similarity to Hauriou’s 
thinking is also apparent in the way that Judges Shelat and Grover understand the 
constituent power. All three understand the constituent power as an instituted 
power, which should be exercised by a specifically-elected constitutional assembly. 
141ibid [570–71].
142See in this sense the argumentation of Judge Reddy at ibid [1190] and the argumentation of Judges Hedge and 
Mukherjea ibid [689] and [705]. However, Judge Khanna rejected this idea, ibid [1599 (vi)].
143ibid. [309]. See also the related argument by Judges Hegde and Mukherjea ibid [692].
144Schmitt refers to the article of William L Marbury, “Limitations upon the Amending Power” (1919–1920) 33 Harv L Rev 
223. See Schmitt, Verfassungslehre (n 3) 106. Marbury wrote: “It may be safely premised that the power to ‘amend’ the 
Constitution was not intended to include the power to destroy it.” (ibid 225).
145See above under I.1.
146See above under I.2.
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They do not share Schmitt’s idea of an almighty constituent power not subject to 
control. However, Judges Shelat and Grover do not discuss any limitation on such 
an instituted constituent power, although we can clearly identify here Hauriou’s idea 
that an amending power that is not organized as a constitutional assembly should 
only have a limited right to amend the constitution.147
IV. The end
The development of the Indian basic-structure doctrine is a powerful example of 
how to justify implied limits on constitutional amendments without relying on 
Schmitt’s false and dangerous doctrine. Even though the general notions, that 
there should be implied limits on constitutional amendment and that the amending 
power is a limited power, migrated to the Indian Supreme Court and became part of 
the basic-structure doctrine, the dangerous and illegitimate parts of this theory are 
currently lost in space and time. However, it would be remiss to let this tale end 
with the famous saying, “And they all lived happily ever after.” Rather, the tale must 
end with a word of caution concerning Schmitt’s theory and his idea of 
a constituent power looming behind the idea of implied limits on constitutional 
amendment.148 It is important to bear in mind the dubious origins of the idea of 
implied limits on the amending power to ensure that Schmitt’s ghost does not 
destroy the basic-structure doctrine. Schmitt’s theory, together with other theories 
that recognize a legally-relevant (primary) constituent power (that is unbound),149 
can always be used to overcome express or implied limits on constitutional 
amendment.150 Schmitt’s theory is particularly prone to use in destroying 
a democratic constitution altogether. His theory of an almighty and constituent 
power not subject to control151 can easily be used to overcome any legal and 
constitutional forms.152
The idea of implied constitutional limits on constitutional amendment is indeed 
a constitutional concept that has two sides: a bright side that protects the funda-
mental democratic core of a constitution, and a dark one (inspired by Schmitt) that 
could well result in the destruction of a democratic constitutional state. It must, 
therefore, be handled with the utmost care.
147See above under I.2.
148See regarding for an approach to the concept of constituent power closer to Schmitt in India Upendra Baxi, “Some 
Reflections on the Nature of Constituent Power”. < http://14.139.60.114:8080/jspui/bitstream/123456789/735/15/Some 
%20Reflections%20on%20the%20Nature%20of%20Constituent%20Power.pdf > accessed 3 March 2020.
149See regarding the French approach above under I 2.
150Yaniv Roznai, Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments (Oxford University Press 2017) 230; cf. David Landau, ‘Should 
the Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments Doctrine be Part of the Canon?” (Int’l J. Const. L. Blog, 10 June 2013). 
< http://www.iconnectblog.com/2013/06/should-the-unconstitutional-constitutional-amendments-doctrine-be-part- 
of-the-canon > accessed 3 March 2020. See regarding the German eternity clause: Polzin (n 39).
151Roznai (n 150) 230 therefore rightly argues that constitutional theory should advance an understanding of what is 
a “genuine” resp. “legitimate” exercise of the primary constituent power.
152Cf. in the Schmittian sense the argumentation of Mr. A. Ken, learned Counsel for the original respondent in the famous 
Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain 1975 AIR 2299 < https://indiankanoon.org/doc/936707/> accessed 3 March 2020, para. 519: 
“The constituent power springs as the fountainhead and partakes of sovereignty and is the power which creates the 
organ and distributes the powers. Therefore, in a sense the constituent power is all-embracing and is at once judicial, 
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